Atlantic and Pacific Tsunami exercises under way

Tsunami exercise "LANTEX 10" commenced at midnight GMT today, with the first message sent by the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Centre. This is a scripted exercise to test tsunami response plans. LANTEX 10, simulates a magnitude 7.5 earthquake off the New England coast. Detail of the exercise, including the timeline of what is scheduled to happen when is available in the LANTEX10 Handbook Version 3.0.

There is also the corresponding Pacific exercise PACIFEX 10, simulating a magnitude 9.0 earthquake south of the Alaska Peninsula. Details are in the PACIFEX10 Handbook Version 3.0. In addition Alaska and California are conducting tests of their Emergency Alert Systems, including on TV and radio the same day.

It should be noted for those used to more free flowing exercises, as used by the UK and Australia, the US exercises tend to be more tightly scripted.

ps: Also note, as it says in all messages issued: THIS IS ONLY AN EXERCISE.

Commercial Emergency Alert Services

In the last day I have been contacted by two companies offering emergency alert services in Australia to governments, schools and companies. These are the Early Warning Network from Kerry Plowright's Look Here Pty Ltd and Emergency Contact from OnCall Messaging. These seem to have been promoted by the recent run of weather related emergencies in Australia. In theory the Australian state and federal governments now provide phone, text message and broadcast emergency warning services, but as I have detailed previously, these leave a lot to be desired, so there is room for commercial providers.

Australian Tsunami Awareness Review

Yesterday, the Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, announced a Tsunami Awareness Project, and a review of the public response to tsunami warnings. These are of limited value due to a lack of detail about the review and restrictions placed on distribution of the awareness campaign materials by the Attorney.

"Tsunami Education and Awareness" is a CD-ROM and web site distributed by Surf Life Saving Australia. The Attorney says he has written to Emergency Services Ministers and Surf Life Saving Organisations requesting a review of the public response to tsunami warnings. It is not clear who is conducting the review, what resources have been made available for it or when it is to be completed. The Attorney did not release the proposed terms of reference for the review.

While Australia has a well designed and run Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre (JATWC) provided by the Bureau of Meteorology and Geoscience Australia, there is no national system for the warnings to be distributed through government agencies, nor a response coordinated. Warnings are sent to an ad-hoc arrangement of state organisations and then to an assortment of local bodies. It is not surprising that the public may take little notice of the resulting confusing and contradictory messages they get as a result.

An example of the lack of effort for Tsunami warning is show by the Queensland Government's "Queensland Tsunami Notification Protocol" (Version 1 , 9 December 2009). This has been distributed as a 9 page 3.7Mbyte PDF document, scanned from a paper original. As a result the text of the protocol cannot be found with a search or copied for use. The protocol contains such outdated procedures as the JTWC contacting Queensland by telephone before issuing a Tsunami warning. This is not an acceptable procedure as it would delay the issue of a warning and risk public safety. The protocol assumes a 90 minute warning for a Tsunami. However, situations can arise much more quickly, which would place emergency personnel in the ethical dilemma of either following procedures or ignoring them to issue a timely warning. The Protocol does not specify how agencies within Queensland are notified. Based on previously experience of a Tsunami warning in Queensland, it is not clear the Queensland Government has a system for coordinating a response.

The review will be conducted with State and Territory Emergency Services Agencies, Local Governments, surf life saving organisations and other stakeholders and will focus on:

• ways to better educate and prepare the public for, and improve its response to, future tsunami warnings, and
• mechanisms for the effective distribution of tsunami warnings to the public. ...
  

From: Tsunami Awareness Project, Media Release, Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, 6 March 2010

Tsunami Education and Awareness Material

The distribution of the awareness material distributed by Surf Life Saving Australia will be greatly hampered be the Attorney's decision to ban making copies. The Attorney has imposed copyright restrictions on the material banning the making of any copies without written permission of the federal government. The Attorney could have instead used a Creative Commons licence, freely allowing not-for-profit distribution.

Tests on the main menu page of the awareness kit show:

1. No HTML Validation Errors.
2. Score of only 35/100 with the W3C mobileOK Checker. It would be very useful for such a awareness program to be compatible with mobile phones used by young people.
3. On an automated accessibility test (TAW 3.0 for WACG 1.0) the page had zero Priority 1, sixteen Priority 2 and 4 Priority 3 problems. It would be useful if the page at least met current Australian guidelines for accessibility of web sites by the disabled.
   

Table of Contents of the Awareness Campaign

• What are the myths?
• How do tsunami work?
• Causes of tsunami
• History
• Tsunami in Australia
• Quiz

Australian Tsunami Warning Issued after Chile Earthquake

The Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre (JATWS) issued a National Warning Summary and Marine Tsunami Warnings for Norfolk Island, Lord Howe Island, Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland at 5:37AM after an earthquake in Chile. The marine warning was for dangerous waves, strong ocean currents and some localised flooding from around 8am (times vary by location).

The text of the warnings issued by the JATWS are confusing, as they say "TOP PRIORITY FOR IMMEDIATE AND FREQUENT BROADCAST", but do not order use of the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS).

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre issued an Expanding Regional Warning for areas near the earthquake at0646Z 27 FEB 2010. It issued a Pacific Ocean-wide Warning at 1045Z 27 FEB 2010, with supplements every few minutes.

The West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Centre (WCATWC) turned their traffic light symbol to orange to indicate an advisory.

WCATWCV showed a simplified map displaying South America, with the earthquake indicated by a red cross.

National Warning Summary issued 5:37AM EDT Sunday 28 February 2010

IDY68020

Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology

MEDIA:

NO USE OF STANDARD EMERGENCY WARNING SIGNAL (SEWS)

REFER TO INDIVIDUAL STATE AND TERRITORY TSUNAMI WARNINGS AND WATCHES FOR MORE

DETAILED INFORMATION.

********************************************************************************

NATIONAL TSUNAMI WARNING SUMMARY FOR AUSTRALIA NUMBER 10

Issued by the Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre (JATWC) at

5:37 AM EDT on Sunday 28 February 2010

********************************************************************************

TSUNAMI SOURCE:

An undersea earthquake of magnitude 8.8 occurred at 5:34 PM EDT on Saturday 27

February 2010 near THE COAST OF CENTRAL CHILE (latitude 35.320S longitude

72.930W ).

********************************************************************************

NATIONAL TSUNAMI WARNING STATUS SUMMARY:

Norfolk Island Marine Warning issued 6:01AM local time Sunday 28 February 2010

Lord Howe Island Marine Warning issued 5:31AM EDT Sunday 28 February 2010

Tasmania Marine Warning issued 5:31AM EDT Sunday 28 February 2010

Victoria Marine Warning issued 5:30AM EDT Sunday 28 February 2010

New South Wales Marine Warning issued 5:30AM EDT Sunday 28 February 2010

Queensland Marine Warning issued 4:30AM EST Sunday 28 February 2010

********************************************************************************

TSUNAMI DETAILS

The following sea level gauges have observed a tsunami:

Heights refer to wave amplitudes (half the peak to trough value).

GAUGE LOCATION LAT LON TIME AMPL

------------------- ----- ------ ----- ---------------

RIKITEA FRENCH POLYNS 23.1S 134.9W 1559Z 0.15M

DART MARQUESAS 51406 8.5S 125.0W 1531Z 0.18M

CALDERA CHILE 27.1S 70.8W 0843Z 0.45M

TALCAHUANO CHILE 36.7S 73.4W 0653Z 2.34M

COQUIMBO CHILE 30.0S 71.3W 0852Z 1.32M

CORRAL CHILE 39.9S 73.4W 0739Z 0.90M

VALPARAISO CHILE 33.0S 71.6W 0708Z 1.29M

IQUIQUE CHILE 20.2S 70.1W 0907Z 0.28M

ANTOFAGASTA CHILE 23.2S 70.4W 0941Z 0.49M

ARICA CHILE 18.5S 70.3W 1007Z 0.94M

DART 32412 18.0S 86.4W 0941Z 0.24M

SAN FELIX CHILE 26.3S 80.1W 0815Z 0.53M

VALPARAISO CHILE 33.0S 71.6W 0708Z 1.29M

EASTER ISLAND 27.2S 109.5W 1205Z 0.35M

BALTRA GALAPAGS IS 0.4S 90.3W 1452Z 0.35M

********************************************************************************

FOR LATEST AND FURTHER INFORMATION:

Refer to individual State and Territory tsunami warnings and watches issued by

the JATWC for more detailed information.

Listen for any further advice from your local emergency service through the

media.

Maps showing the affected areas are on the Bureau web site www.bom.gov.au.

For emergency assistance, call your local emergency service on 132 500. Call

the Tasmania Police on 131 444.

********************************************************************************

NEXT UPDATE:

The next national warning summary will be issued at 7:07 AM EDT on Sunday 28

February 2010

********************************************************************************

EDT = Eastern Daylight Time

EST = Eastern Standard Time = EDT - 1 hour

CST = Central Standard Time = EDT - 1.5 hours

CDT = Central Daylight Time = EDT - 30 minutes

WST = Western Standard Time = EDT - 3 hours

The JATWC is operated by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and Geoscience

Australia

********************************************************************************

TSUNAMI BULLETIN NUMBER 014
PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER/NOAA/NWS
ISSUED AT 1934Z 27 FEB 2010

THIS BULLETIN APPLIES TO AREAS WITHIN AND BORDERING THE PACIFIC
OCEAN AND ADJACENT SEAS...EXCEPT ALASKA...BRITISH COLUMBIA...
WASHINGTON...OREGON AND CALIFORNIA.

... A WIDESPREAD TSUNAMI WARNING IS IN EFFECT ...

A TSUNAMI WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR

CHILE / PERU / ECUADOR / COLOMBIA / ANTARCTICA / PANAMA /
COSTA RICA / NICARAGUA / PITCAIRN / HONDURAS / EL SALVADOR /
GUATEMALA / FR. POLYNESIA / MEXICO / COOK ISLANDS / KIRIBATI /
KERMADEC IS / NIUE / NEW ZEALAND / TONGA / AMERICAN SAMOA /
SAMOA / JARVIS IS. / WALLIS-FUTUNA / TOKELAU / FIJI /
AUSTRALIA / HAWAII / PALMYRA IS. / TUVALU / VANUATU /
HOWLAND-BAKER / NEW CALEDONIA / JOHNSTON IS. / SOLOMON IS. /
NAURU / MARSHALL IS. / MIDWAY IS. / KOSRAE / PAPUA NEW GUINEA /
POHNPEI / WAKE IS. / CHUUK / RUSSIA / MARCUS IS. / INDONESIA /
N. MARIANAS / GUAM / YAP / BELAU / JAPAN / PHILIPPINES /
CHINESE TAIPEI

THIS BULLETIN IS ISSUED AS ADVICE TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.  ONLY
NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE
DECISIONS REGARDING THE OFFICIAL STATE OF ALERT IN THEIR AREA AND
ANY ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE.

AN EARTHQUAKE HAS OCCURRED WITH THESE PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS

ORIGIN TIME -  0634Z 27 FEB 2010
COORDINATES -  36.1 SOUTH   72.6 WEST
DEPTH       -   55 KM
LOCATION    -  NEAR COAST OF CENTRAL CHILE
MAGNITUDE   -  8.8

MEASUREMENTS OR REPORTS OF TSUNAMI WAVE ACTIVITY

GAUGE LOCATION        LAT   LON    TIME        AMPL         PER
-------------------  ----- ------  -----  ---------------  -----
CABO SAN LUCAS MX    22.9N 109.9W  1833Z   0.36M /  1.2FT  12MIN
DART TONGA 51426     23.0S 168.1W  1844Z   0.04M /  0.1FT  30MIN
HIVA OA MARQUESAS     9.8S 139.0W  1741Z   1.79M /  5.9FT  12MIN
PAPEETE TAHITI       17.5S 149.6W  1810Z   0.16M /  0.5FT  10MIN
NUKU HIVA MARQUESAS   8.9S 140.1W  1745Z   0.95M /  3.1FT  04MIN
MANZANILLO MX        19.1N 104.3W  1705Z   0.32M /  1.0FT  24MIN
DART MANZANILLO 434  16.0N 107.0W  1611Z   0.07M /  0.2FT  24MIN
ACAPULCO MX          16.8N  99.9W  1549Z   0.16M /  0.5FT  24MIN
RIKITEA PF           23.1S 134.9W  1559Z   0.15M /  0.5FT  22MIN
DART MARQUESAS 5140   8.5S 125.0W  1531Z   0.18M /  0.6FT  18MIN
BALTRA GALAPAGS EC    0.4S  90.3W  1452Z   0.35M /  1.2FT  14MIN
EASTER CL            27.2S 109.5W  1205Z   0.35M /  1.1FT  52MIN
ANCUD CL             41.9S  73.8W  0838Z   0.62M /  2.0FT  84MIN
CALLAO LA-PUNTA PE   12.1S  77.2W  1029Z   0.36M /  1.2FT  30MIN
ARICA CL             18.5S  70.3W  1008Z   0.94M /  3.1FT  42MIN
IQUIQUE CL           20.2S  70.1W  0907Z   0.28M /  0.9FT  68MIN
ANTOFAGASTA CL       23.2S  70.4W  0941Z   0.49M /  1.6FT  52MIN
DART LIMA 32412      18.0S  86.4W  0941Z   0.24M /  0.8FT  36MIN
CALDERA CL           27.1S  70.8W  0843Z   0.45M /  1.5FT  20MIN
TALCAHUANO CL        36.7S  73.4W  0653Z   2.34M /  7.7FT  88MIN
COQUIMBO CL          30.0S  71.3W  0852Z   1.32M /  4.3FT  30MIN
CORRAL CL            39.9S  73.4W  0739Z   0.90M /  2.9FT  16MIN
SAN FELIX CL         26.3S  80.1W  0815Z   0.53M /  1.7FT  08MIN
VALPARAISO CL        33.0S  71.6W  0708Z   1.29M /  4.2FT  20MIN

LAT  - LATITUDE (N-NORTH, S-SOUTH)
LON  - LONGITUDE (E-EAST, W-WEST)
TIME - TIME OF THE MEASUREMENT (Z IS UTC IS GREENWICH TIME)
AMPL - TSUNAMI AMPLITUDE MEASURED RELATIVE TO NORMAL SEA LEVEL.
IT IS ...NOT... CREST-TO-TROUGH WAVE HEIGHT.
VALUES ARE GIVEN IN BOTH METERS(M) AND FEET(FT).
PER  - PERIOD OF TIME IN MINUTES(MIN) FROM ONE WAVE TO THE NEXT.

EVALUATION

SEA LEVEL READINGS CONFIRM THAT A TSUNAMI HAS BEEN GENERATED
WHICH COULD CAUSE WIDESPREAD DAMAGE. AUTHORITIES SHOULD TAKE
APPROPRIATE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT. THIS CENTER WILL
CONTINUE TO MONITOR SEA LEVEL DATA TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT AND
SEVERITY OF THE THREAT.

A TSUNAMI IS A SERIES OF WAVES AND THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE
LARGEST. TSUNAMI WAVE HEIGHTS CANNOT BE PREDICTED AND CAN VARY
SIGNIFICANTLY ALONG A COAST DUE TO LOCAL EFFECTS. THE TIME FROM
ONE TSUNAMI WAVE TO THE NEXT CAN BE FIVE MINUTES TO AN HOUR, AND
THE THREAT CAN CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AS MULTIPLE WAVES ARRIVE.

FOR ALL AREAS - WHEN NO MAJOR WAVES ARE OBSERVED FOR TWO HOURS
AFTER THE ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL OR DAMAGING WAVES HAVE NOT
OCCURRED FOR AT LEAST TWO HOURS THEN LOCAL AUTHORITIES CAN ASSUME
THE THREAT IS PASSED. DANGER TO BOATS AND COASTAL STRUCTURES CAN
CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL HOURS DUE TO RAPID CURRENTS. AS LOCAL
CONDITIONS CAN CAUSE A WIDE VARIATION IN TSUNAMI WAVE ACTION THE
ALL CLEAR DETERMINATION MUST BE MADE BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

BULLETINS WILL BE ISSUED HOURLY OR SOONER IF CONDITIONS WARRANT.
THE TSUNAMI WARNING WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

THE WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER WILL ISSUE PRODUCTS
FOR ALASKA...BRITISH COLUMBIA...WASHINGTON...OREGON...CALIFORNIA.

Social Networking Technology for Emergencies

The United Nations Foundation has released "New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: The Role of Information and Social Networks" (2009). The full report is available online, as one donw load and by chapter. The report recommends remove regulatory barriers for better early warning and emergency response and putting more resources into
local preparedness. The call for standardisation of communications is timely, including a global standard for cell broadcast technologies. Australia is entering another bushfire season with limited standardisation of systems at the national level. The report has received some criticism on the Humanitarian ICT discussion list for the breadth of coverage, but such a report can include online a limited amount of material.

1. Foreword
2. Acknowledgements
3. Executive Summary
4. Introduction
5. Alerts: Early Warning And Communication Needs
6. Preparedness: Building Communities’ Resilience
7. Response: Coordination In Emergencies
8. Rebuilding: Post-Crisis Services And Development
9. Recommendations
10. Endnotes

Executive Summary

Natural disasters and violent conflicts have always been part of human existence. But the number of humanitarian crises has been rising in recent years. Moreover, disasters strike
most frequently, and with the most devastating impact, in the least developed countries. These countries also have the weakest communications infrastructures, which poses a
particular challenge to governments, aid agencies, and the affected population at every stage of a crisis, from the runup to a disaster through to long-term reconstruction.

There have been dramatic advances in communications technology: in the number of new technologies, the mobility and range of functions available, and the spread of these technologies. Growth has been particularly strong in the penetration of mobile phones and more recently the uptake of social networking websites including Facebook and Twitter. One important change is a shift from one-to many forms of communication, such as television and radio, to many-to-many forms of communication, such as social
networking and crowdsourcing websites, that is changing the way in which information is delivered and exchanged.

Communications advances present an opportunity forhumanitarian organizations to harness modern technology to communicate more effectively with communities affected by disasters and to allow members of those communities to communicate with each other and with the outside world.

People in affected communities can recover faster if they can access and use information. A look at the use of communications technology during disasters in recent years shows
that while it has played a positive role, its full potential has not yet been realized.

Moreover, governments, humanitarian agencies, and local communities face challenges and risks associated with modern technological innovation. These include:

• Information flows must be two-way to be effective — from the external world to the affected community, but also from those affected to the agencies seeking to help
them in useful ways.
• Information will not be used unless it is trusted. The utility of any technologies will depend on the social context. People are a vital part of the communication system. ...

Recommendations ...

Remove regulatory barriers
Some regulatory barriers to effective early warning systems and emergency response remain, despite the great progress made in these aspects since the Indian Ocean tsunami. We identified:
• the need for further standardization of communications in emergency situations—such as a global standard for cell broadcast technologies, for example;
• the need to develop standards applicable to existing and future systems for delivery of early warnings or alerts;
• the need for inter-operability between public networks and networks dedicated to emergency communications; and
• a need for priority access by emergency services personnel to communications.

Furthermore, governments must extend the regulatory framework to new and emerging technologies. Regulation is lagging behind innovation. In particular:
• the international community needs to create a legal framework enabling the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, which hold great promise for collecting information for
use by humanitarian agencies but are currently unable to be deployed due to legal uncertainties.

Put more resources into local preparedness
People-centeredness has been one of the themes of this report. The people affected by an emergency are in the best position to know what is happening and what they need.

Preparedness requires long-term investment by humanitarian organizations, including investment in public education and capacity building in local media.

Information provision should be recognized as a standard part of both preparedness and aid delivery, and might include:
• preparation of off-the-shelf material agreed on between humanitarian and aid agencies (what to do in an earthquake, basic sanitation advice, for example);
• training humanitarian agencies in communication skills, including receiving and using feedback from communities; and
• the inclusion of a wind-up radio in aid packages.

Information needs to be collected and deployed to be effective. Often this will be done by official agencies, but their responsibilities may be overlapping and uncoordinated.
Preparedness also requires the international humanitarian community to be able to act themselves in a coordinated way on the information and analysis enabled by these emerging systems.

Agencies should share best practices with each other.
Agencies developing tools for use in disaster preparedness and emergency relief should also include consideration of their potential for communities’ post-disaster or postconflict needs, to leverage the investment of resources as effectively as possible.

Governments—especially in developing countries where access is not ubiquitous—also need to consider enhanced access to communications and investment in infrastructure, among all the competing demands for resources.

Leverage new media and crowdsourcing
Some of the most promising applications of new technology in emergencies use social media, often through crowdsourced applications.

As this report has shown, the issue of authentication is a key barrier to overcome. The development of methods and applications for verification of crowdsourced information
should be a priority. The humanitarian community can support the development of innovative platforms that addres the issue of verification as well as provision of information by users.

At the same time, it is important to ensure that communications technologies can offer their users a sufficient degree of anonymity and protection. This will depend on
technological solutions but also, importantly, the legal framework and public debate about the risks as well as benefits of anonymity. ...

From: New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: The Role of Information and Social Networks, United Nations Foundation, December 2009

National Emergency Alert system from next week

The Victorian Premier has announced that the National Emergency Alert system had been tested and will be ready for use next week. Unfortunately there is no emergency information system to back this up with detailed information about the emergency. As a result the National Emergency Alert system is of little value and may cause more harm than good.

The system, developed by Telstra, was previously called the National Emergency Warning System, and can deliver 300 text messages per second and 1000 voice messages per minute.The initial system will use the registered address of the telephone or mobile service and so not be able to target travelling users.

A test recorded audio message was sent containing the Australian Standard Warning Signal. The test text message was:

+6144 444 444

EMERGENCY TEST MESSAGE from the Victorian Government to test the new telephone emergency warning system NO ACTION REQUIRED For more info www.oesc.vic.gov.au

In neither case was the recipient required to take any action. Reception was gauged by random phone poll afterwards. The Victorian government has not released the results of the test. The Victorian Premier should release the results of the test for independent and public review.

Unfortunately the web site people referred to is a policy and administrative one, and contains no useful information about actual emergencies. Having a system which can deliver an emergency message is of little value unless those warned can be referred to more detailed information relevant to the specific emergency. The Victorian government needs to follow the practice adopted by the ACT Government and have a web page specifically about current emergencies.

Emergency 2.0 Australia

Emergency 2.0 Australia, is part of the Australian Government 2.0 Taskforce looking at how Social Media can assist in Emergency Management. In my view Social Networking, the Internet and web, have a useful role in emergency communications. However, disaster management using IT needs to be carefully planned and tested.

The Emergency 2.0 Australia website is incorrect in suggesting that the February Victorian Bushfires saw the emergence of the use of social media and web2.0 technologies. The disaster just brought them to public prominence via the media. These were already being planned, tested and deployed elsewhere.

Lack of Australian emergency warning standard risks lives

For this bushfire season a new Australian National Emergency Warning System has been introduced. Unfortunately there appears to be no standard issued for the formatting of the messages and no harmonisation with other warning messages. As a result this will make it difficult to relay the messages quickly and reliably via media such as SMS. This could result in delayed, misleading or lost messages, with loss of life, as happened in the Victorian Brushfires last year.

After last season when more than 100 lives were lost in Australia a new "Catastrophic (Code Red)" level has been added. There will be increased use on radio of the radio of the Australian Standard Emergency Warning Signal. There are now three Alert levels and warning messages: "Advice", "Watch and Act" and "Emergency Warning".

What is required is a precisely defined format for the messages to be issued. This format must be compatible with the systems which will be used to transmit the messages, including SMS. The message format and language must be consistent with that of other warning messages, including Tsunami warnings. Failure to do this risks lives.

Emergency Operations Centre Specifications

The Nelson City and Tasman District Councils of New Zealand have issued a request for Expression of Interest for a Information and Communications System for a joint Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) (Reference: 27532). This is for emergency and disaster coordination.

The 23 pages of documentation (available to registered companies) includes a concise statement of requirements for such a system. Included is a photo of an EOC, equipped with about 13 computers and having about 20 people in it. In contrast to the usual publicity photos of such centres, this shows the messy reality. The requirements specification also shows a simialr grasp of the chaos which can occour in the early stages of an emergecy.

The documentation also specifies the current computer and telecommunications systems of the councils. These a re quite complex and the Councils might find it better to replace them with a more rationalised streamlined system, rather than try to make these systems suitable for emergency use. Recent advancements in thin client computers using VoIP allow low cost equipment to work at low power from low cost servers. This makes for a much simpler set-up than PCs and IP phones which will require more backup power, networking and servers.

Simple database applications with web based interfaces can be used. In many cases organisations spend considerable effort and money on systems to allow the emergency applications to run in standalone mode, in the event of server loss. In practice, most such systems will not work without the server and it is better to concentrate on a cheap, similar and reliable server system.

Also low power, low cost netbooks could be of use. These could replace more power hungry and expensive laptops. Smart phones with WiFi support may also be of use o supplement netbooks. These can form a useful transportable operations centre, with all the equipment needed for a dozen operators fitting in an airline carry-on size wheeled bag. A central server and WiFi base station would provide access for a dozen netbooks and smart phones. This could be used to supplement the fixed centre and the same location, be deployed nearer an emergency location or be used to replace the centre should it be disabled in the disaster.

Requirements

1.80. The EOC may need to operate under three general scenarios:
a. A local emergency with normal power and telecommunications
b. A local emergency with local interruptions to power and
telecommunications (in this scenario the EOC has its own power supply so ICT within the building can operate)
c. Significant emergency, could be Local, Regional or even a National Emergency with limited or no power supply or telecommunications, EOC could be running from one or two stand alone PCs or possibly have reverted to analogue (plus paper-based) systems 1.81. The EOC, when fully operational could be operating 24 hours a day for several days with 30-40 staff in three revolving eight hour shifts (see image below for an overall impression of what an EOC looks like).

1.82. The above image is of a mature EOC i.e. an EOC well into an emergency. When first activated, particularly in a declared emergency, the situation can be quite chaotic. EOC staff may start to arrive over the course of an hour or more and it might take some time for the EOC to reach ‘critical mass’.

Messaging

1.83. Once activated, several different personnel, though typically designated telephonists within the EOC will need to be able to simultaneously record incoming information. This will include messages from: members of the public phoning in, emergency services communications, reports via radio telephone and/or mobile phone from emergency management personnel on the
ground, emergency management personnel reporting face to face. The EOC personnel having those conversations need to be able to quickly record details of the conversation in a structured way.

1.84. Ideally the person taking the call will be able to choose from different situation choices based on what the caller is saying i.e. flooding, blocked road (and blocked by: slip, fallen tree, vehicle incident), call-taker is prompted by
the system about what questions to ask (possibly in a descending order of importance). Where applicable, responses can be tic-boxes.

1.85. Ideally the system will automatically assign metadata where appropriate i.e. date, time, user ID, machine ID

1.86. The use of geospatial aids (maps) is usual in EOC to aid visual representation of an emergency and as an aid to analysis of the situation. Emergency situations suit such analysis because typically incidents within a wider emergency occur at some location. To facilitate display and analysis within a
geographical information system (GIS) (during and subsequent to an emergency), in capturing those locations, the call-taker should be able to choose from managed lists the location that fits the description from the caller i.e. Address (18 Hampden Street, Murchison), Road Intersections (cnr Motueka Quay and Glenaven Drive, Motueka), Road (waimea Road, Nelson), Place or Places (Broadgreen House or Appleby School), River Segments (Washbourn Stream between Hill Street and Washbourn Drive or Motueka River between Woodstock and Stanleybrook).

1.87. Assigning criteria to calls: The person taking the call will need to be able to assign a range of different criteria to an individual message.
• Validation: Who was the caller? How reliable is their information? Was the caller ‘Joe Bloggs’, untrained and unqualified member of the public or a trained and experienced member of Emergency Services or an Emergency Management Field Operative? The information supplied by the latter would be rated higher than the former.
• Urgency: i.e. ‘routine’ through to ‘requires immediate attention’
• Importance: i.e. ‘routine’ through to ‘highest’
1.88. The system would be able to ‘flag’ or highlight individual messages based on a criteria i.e. ‘Red-Flag’ for urgent or important or ‘Blue-Flag’ for routine.
1.89. Have the capability to link or group one or more messages together.
1.90. Often in an emergency situation the EOC will receive multiple calls in a short span of times about the same situation. Rather than record this multiple times, it would be more efficient if you could record the same base information e.g. “Appleby Bridge approaches washed out”, then note the number of calls
received about that. Explain how the system might achieve this.
Request for Expressions of Interest to Supply

Workflow
1.91. Once the EOC call taker or team member has captured all the information regards a particular message, they need to be able to:
• Assign the message to an individual EOC team member
• Assign the message to an EOC team e.g. Planning and Intelligence
• Assign a message to multiple individuals and/or teams
1.92. The system routes a particular message via some form of workflow function to the assigned individual/s and/or team/s
1.93. In the event no individual/s or team/s are assigned to a particular message, the message can be configured to rout particular messages, based on a userdefined criteria to an individual or team based on one of the captured criteria
e.g. all messaged tagged ‘highest’ importance go to the Controller
1.94. Individuals and team can quickly and easily see/be alerted to/find messages assigned to them
1.95. Individuals and/or groups need to be able to add to a message. This may include adding additional information and/or comments. Assigning or reassigning status e.g. under action, closed, validation required, or assigning to an additional individual or team
1.96. Explain how the workflow function works.
1.97. Once messages have been processed have the ability to check or tag them in some way as ‘complete’ or ‘actioned’ etc. and they disappear from the ‘active’ list/screen but stay in the system.

Scalability/Portability
1.98. Could have the capability to be installed, stand alone within Councils smaller EOCs; Motueka, Takaka, Murchison but with the capability to communicate (integrate) with the main EOC
1.99. System can be scaled to monitor and/or manage the range response levels (from Introduction): Level 3 – Local Coordination; Level 4 – Regional Coordination i.e. the system may start off monitoring/managing a single incident which eventually escalates into a full emergency.
1.100. While for most emergencies it would be envisaged the system would operate within Councils existing ICT infrastructure (refer ‘Existing System & Environment section) because of the nature of emergencies it would also need the capability to run in a stand alone situation i.e. be network independent. How would that work?

Integration
1.101. External communication is an important component of an emergency response i.e. letting interested parties know about the status of the emergency; where evacuation points might be; what areas have been evacuated etc. The system would be able to communicate, preferably via standards-based protocols to external agencies/sites i.e. make available data/information feeds in standard formats e.g. Really Simple Syndication (RSS) or Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) or Keyhole Markup Language (KML). Consumers of such feeds could include: Nelson City and Tasman District Offices, Emergency Services (Fire, Police, Ambulance), National Crisis Management Centre,
National Health Coordination Centre. Explain capability for this.
1.102. The system might want the capability to utilise real-time data feeds using standard protocols from TDC and NCC core systems. How could that happen?
1.103. System would have the potential to integrate with Councils geographical information systems (GIS), specifically Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) ArcGIS Server, through web services or other standardsbased integration methods.

How might that work?
Architecture
1.104. Please supply details of the systems architecture.
1.105. Explain how server/PC images, versions and upgrades could be managed particularly at satellite locations such as Murchison.
1.106. How is your system be licensed including those costs.
1.107. Would any changes be required to Councils existing architecture?
Setup and operation
1.108. The system would need to be relatively straightforward and quick to setup/activate/get going once the EOC is activated. Please explain how this might happen.
1.109. Any system should follow established keyboard quick-key functions e.g. Ctrl>C for copy etc.
1.110. Though some system training would be anticipated, graphical user interfaces (GUI) and functional methods would need to be intuitive. Give us some examples if available.
1.111. Please explain how your system creates and manages the message objects it creates?
1.112. In the event of a situation where power supply to the building is affected or the nature of the emergency requires the EOC to relocate, it may be required to fail-over to a manual system. How would/could the system report the current status of the emergency, elements of which the system manages such
that this could be replicated and then managed on-going in an analogue (hardcopy) environment.

Reporting/Display
1.113. The system will need to be able to report on of individual or groups or types of messages based on different user-defined criteria
• Status of messages tagged with a specific urgency rating
• Show messages not actions after a certain length of time
• Show all messages of a certain type e.g. flooding
• or number of messages logged over this time frame
• all messages to a specific user or group
• Please detail reporting functionality.

1.114. Describe any central administration tools you can offer or how you propose council would monitor and support the solution;
1.115. Is there any software that can automatically inform council of problems?
1.116. Is there a central management console and what functions does it support?
Status/Message Board
1.117. The system will need a ‘status board’ functionality to display the latest key data in relation to an emergency event the EOC is managing. This might be thought of as key performance indicator (KPI) reporting and be based on a number of ‘indicators’. The status board will give a ‘snapshot’ of the
situation.
1.118. The status board would also provide key information such as if a state of emergency is declared, and when.

Knowledge Base
1.119. Some kind of knowledgebase would be useful. This could include standard information generic to a general or type of emergency i.e. key contacts, designated assembly points etc. It could also include information about the specific emergency at hand i.e. evacuation centres established, status of individual towns etc. If a knowledgebase was to be utilised in this way it
would need the capability to evolve as the emergency evolved. ...

From: Request for Expressions of Interest to Supply
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS FOR COUNCIL’S EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRE (EOC), NELSON CITY COUNCIL and TASMAN DISTRICT COUNCIL, New Zealand, 14 September 2009.

Tsunami warning and response for Samoa

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre detected a magnitude 7.9 earthquake in the Samoa Islands region at 1748Z 29 September 2009. In response a Tsunami Warning and Watch was issued 16 minutes later at 1804Z (Bulletin 1). In all 11 messages were issued, the last being 0501Z 30 September 2009. The centre issued messages for both Hawaii and the Pacific.

Due to the closeness of the earthquake to Samoa and limitations in the technology available, the warning message was issued 5 minutes after the predicted arrival time of the Tsunami (1759Z) at the first population centre, Pago Pago in American Samoa.

The centre issues warnings to national authorities and there is then a delay while local authorities decide if, and how, to warn the public.
At best only 11 minutes warning could have been provided (assuming instantaneous detection, analysis and alert). Telecommunications systems can provide a warning within one minute.

The warning was also forwarded by email by UNESCO to the Interim Indian Ocean warning system mailing list. This message was dated Tue, 29 Sep 2009 18:04:43 GMT. It was received from UNESCO approximately three minutes later by the Fastmail.fm mail system and a summary by SMS via Vodafone Australia within one minute.

Samoa uses a system of sirens and church bells to the warn the population of Tsunami. The USA has a system of "NOAA Weather Radio" which issues automated warnings. There is a NOAA transmitter in American Samoa, located in Pago Pago.

During a visit to Samoa in 2005 to teach web design for UNESCO, I noticed that while a national digital telephone network had not yet been installed, there was a limited private GSM service (a similar service existed in Tonga). There were proposals for a GSM network in Samoa in 2007, but it is not clear how this has progressed. The significance of these networks is that they provide the SMS and SMS cell broadcast networks, which could be used to issue emergency warnings.

Sequence	Time	Type
1	29/09/09 18:03	Expanding Regional Warning
2	29/09/09 18:05	Watch Statement
3	29/09/09 18:54	Expanding Regional Warning Supplement
4	29/09/09 18:57	Watch Supplement Statement
5	29/09/09 20:21	Expanding Regional Warning Supplement
6	29/09/09 20:23	Watch Cancellation Statement
7	29/09/09 21:34	Expanding Regional Warning Cancellation
8	30/09/09 01:58	Advisory Statement
9	30/09/09 03:03	Advisory Supplement Statement
10	30/09/09 03:57	Advisory Supplement Statement
11	30/09/09 05:01	Final Advisory Statement

Disaster Communications

Disaster Communications in a Changing Media World by Kim S Haddow and George Haddow (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008) gives some useful general tips on media management for government and non-government disaster management organisations. This book is not about the technicalities of how to provide telecommunications during a disaster, it is about how to talk to the media, and through the media to the population. It also touches on the use of new media, email, SMS, the web and instant messaging. However, the bulk of the book is common-sense advice which applies to any media. The book suffers from a strong US bias, dealing the history of FEMA. There are a comical number of photos of public officials talking to journalists. There are some useful case studies. However, overall the book is disappointing, as the message seems to be than public communication is about a spokesman (yes, they are almost all male) standing up giving an interview to the TV and radio.

Some topics: incident command system, national response framework, social media, neighbourhood communications networks, mitigation messages, preparedness messages, first informers, changing media world, trusted community leaders, emergency management operations, next disaster strikes, disaster messages, emergency officials, emergency management organisations, cable news outlets, citizen journalists, media partnership, emergency managers, mitigation initiative, online news sites, traditional media outlets, citizen journalism, disaster information, participatory journalism, incident management system

Victorian Government asking for mobile phone bushfire system

The Victorian Government has issued a Request for Information (RFI) for "Location Based Identification of Active Mobile Handsets for Emergency Notification Purposes (SS-06-2009, 6 August 2009, closing 28 October 2009). There is a four page document (pdf format, 572 kBytes). Appended is an excerpt from the Statement of Requirements in the document.

There some obvious flaws in the RFI. The first is that the RFI is assuming a particular technical solution to the problem of altering people to an emergency. Specifically the RFI refers to Location Based Identification of Active Mobile Handsets". This assumes it is feasible, legal, safe and necessary to identify where handsets are, in order to issue a localised bushfire warning. As I have discussed in a number of presentations this year, this is not necessary and may not be desirable. A further problem is the the time for the RFI, to which a decision is not expected until late February 2010.

Victoria has an urgent need for bushfire emergency warning systems. By selecting a solution which will involve complex technical and legal issues and by cutting off alternatives which may be better, even before an RFI is issued, the Victorian Government is delaying the implementation of a workable system and thus placing at further risk its citizens. There is a risk that a complex system will take longer to produce and will be less reliable. Also producing a system which too precisely tracks where citizens are will create privacy concerns and may also give a false sense of the precision of the information which citizens will receive. Victoria should aim to build a simple robust system first. In addition Victoria has to build and test a clear chain of command for who can decide to issue warnings using the system.

RFI Part B – Statement of Requirements

Department of Treasury and Finance – Government Services Group

Request for Information for Location Based Identification of Active Mobile Handsets for Emergency Notification purposes

1.OVERVIEW
COAG has agreed to take immediate steps to enhance Australia’s natural disaster arrangements through the development of a telephone-based emergency warning system that will enable the States and Territories (the States) to deliver warnings to landline and mobile telephones, based on the billing address of the subscriber, to be operational by October 2009 and to undertake further research into a capability to deliver warnings based on the location of a mobile telephone.
Communication with potentially affected individuals before, during and after emergencies is critical and it is an area where the States and the emergency service organisations can leverage telecommunications technology to greater advantage as the provision of information to individuals during emergencies can make a critical difference.

The delivery of emergency warnings to landline and mobile telephones, based on the billing address of the subscriber, component is being addressed through the NEWS (National Emergency Warning System) Request for Tender (RFT) for all States except Western Australia. Western Australia will deliver their emergency warning messages using WA StateAlert.

We recognize that individuals have become increasingly mobile and we acknowledge that location based identification of active mobile handsets within a geographically defined emergency area will provide an efficient and effective method to notify potentially affected individuals.

To further our research into the identification of location based active mobile handsets for the purpose of emergency warning notification, and to potentially supplement the NEWS, we are seeking an understanding of your wireless location based capability in this regard.

This document describes the background for seeking an understanding of location based identification of active mobile handsets, for the purpose of emergency warning notification, with a view to incorporating this technology within the NEWS.

2.Background

Both Federal and State government have undertaken research to determine the most effective method of notifying individuals of impending or existing emergency events that could have an impact on the welfare of individuals within the geographically defined emergency area.

Consumer trends reveal that the preferred method of communication with an individual is the mobile telephone.

Australia has a mobile telephone saturation point in excess of 100% and this is currently increasing.1

Australia: Population and Cellular Market Penetration ...


At the same time the domestic penetration of fixed line telephone is decreasing. ...

3.Requirements

It is our aim to understand current and future capability of mobile location based services that are able to be provided by a solution provider.
We would further like to understand your view of network or other component enhancements that may be necessary to enable the location based identification of active mobile handsets for the purpose of emergency warning notification.
We would also like to understand the current impediments that exist which may prevent location based technology from being utilised to identify active mobile handsets within a defined emergency area.

These expectations may vary based on locality of emergency event and the type of emergency event. These expectations will be further explored based on requirement for accuracy, speed of delivery, delivery indicator and network load. We aim to understand what degree of certainty and accuracy can be achieved through the different methods of targeting location based active handset messaging.

Emergency event types may dictate a requirement for outbound messages to be delivered to targeted active mobile handsets. This requirement may range from naturally occurring events, with an amount of lead time before the event is predicted to occur through to more urgent man-made, instantaneous emergency events concentrated in Capital city Central Business District precincts.

Examples of the message volumes for mass dissemination are in the range of 1,000 messages for specific public safety messages where precision of accuracy is required, 5,000 for town or shire type notification, 20,000 for metropolitan targeted warning, 50,000 for widespread urban events such as flooding through to 100,000 upwards for extreme and CBD centric events.

Emergency warning messages may be disseminated using either voice or text.
It will be essential to understand the capability and precision of location based identification of active mobile handsets across CBD, metropolitan, urban and rural localities.

This understanding of capability across different cell density and cell types will further allow emergency service organisations to structure their emergency warning processes and procedures appropriately and with a clear understanding of what the technology can provide based on locality and requirement of the emergency event type. This exercise may require a collaborative and open approach between government with

Respondents.
The table below illustrates various emergency event types and fundamental requirements to be met as part of delivering that type of emergency warning.

Table 1

Wireless Technology Characteristics ...

Response Required

As location based services mature, and for certain emergency event types, it would be envisaged that:

• the technology will have the ability to receive notifications about any new mobile devices entering a previously specified emergency area to alert the user that, for example, an emergency services vehicle has arrived at a location, or a civilian has entered the area and may be unaware of the emergency
• the technology will include the ability to receive notifications for any mobile devices exiting the defined emergency area. This could facilitate the creation of an evacuation list of people who are still remaining in the emergency area
• the technology will be able to locate specific mobile devices in both 2G and 3G networks, and overlay their position onto a map.
• the technology will have the ability to provide sufficient privacy and authentication checking mechanisms to ensure mobile location security
  

This understanding of a Respondent’s ability to identify location based active mobile handsets will enable governments to consider any future adoption of this capability ...

From: "Location Based Identification of Active Mobile Handsets for Emergency Notification Purposes, SS-06-2009, Request for Information (RFI), Department of Treasury and Finance, Victorian Government, 6 August 2009

Location Based Services for Emergency Management

Today I was interviewed by Anas Aloudat at the University of Wollongong for new research on Location-Based Services for Emergency Management. This is very timely work, give the issue of alerting for bushfires.

Already published:

1. "Location-Based Services for Emergency Management: A Multi-Stakeholder Perspective", Anas Aloudat, K. Michael, and Roba Abbas. The Eighth International Conference on Mobile Business (ICMB 2009). Dalian, China: IEEE Computer Society, 2009. 1-6.
2. "The Current State of Commercial Location-based Service Offerings in Australia", Roba Abbas, K. Michael, M.G. Michael, and Anas Aloudat. The Eighth International Conference on Mobile Business (ICMB 2009). Dalian, China: IEEE Computer Society, 2009. 1-8.
3. "Location-Based Services in Emergency Management- from Government to Citizens: Global Case Studies", A. Aloudat, K. Michael, and J. Yan.Recent Advances in Security Technology (1 ed). Ed. P. Mendis, J. Lai, E. Dawson and H. Abbass. Canberra, Australia: Australian Homeland Security Research Centre, 2007. 190-201.

Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Interim Report

The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Interim Report was released today. The recommendations relating to the use of ICT, the Internet and the web are well thought out. The report is in the form of a set of reasonably well formatted, efficiently web pages.

The report executive summary scored 32 out of 100 on the W3C mobileOK Checker, which is better than many web pages. One flaw is that images for the report have been marked with hyperlinks labelled "CLICK FOR IMAGE". It would have been better to include a small preview image or have a link on the caption of the image. The executive summary failed an automated web accessibility test (WCAG 2) with 517 problems, which are easily correctable.

• Introductory pages
• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Chapters:
  
  1. The February 2009 Fires
  2. Engaging Communities
  3. Submissions
  4. Warnings
  5. Information
  6. Relocation
  7. Stay or Go
  8. Risk and Refuge
  9. Incident Management: A Case Study
  10. Emergency Management
  11. Commonwealth Response
  12. Emergency Calls
  13. Next Steps
• Appendices:
  1. Parties Given Leave to Appear
  2. Hearing days and witnesses

ICT related recommendations:

• RECOMMENDATION 4.5: The State ensure that the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) be used in Victoria to precede each bushfire warning or group of warnings for bushfires that are dangerous or extremely dangerous, particularly for a fire that is burning out of control and poses a threat to human life, subject to appropriate limits on the maximum frequency of use.
• RECOMMENDATION 4.8: The Australian Government, Council of Australian Governments and the State determine whether it is technically possible to implement the second phase of the national telephony-based warning system (that is, the delivery of warning messages to mobile phones based on the physical location of a handset at the time of the emergency) with a view to implementation for the 2009–10 bushfire season.
• RECOMMENDATION 5.2: The Bureau of Meteorology include the Forest Fire Danger Index and the Grass Fire Danger Index in its fire weather warnings and general weather forecasts on its website and in material distributed to the media.
• RECOMMENDATION 5.3: The State ensure that a single, multi-agency portal for bushfire information be established that uploads information simultaneously to both CFA and DSE websites.

Warning Systems For University Campuses

"Deciphering the New Federal Integrated Public Alert and Warning System" by Dewitt Latimer provides a useful overview of issues with providing emergency warning messages on university campuses. It is written from the US point of view and uses terminology relating to US federal legisation for issueing energy wanrings to citizens (with the emphasis being on how to relay these to people on a campus, susally via SMS on a mobile phone). But the article will be of interst to those outside the USA.

"This research bulletin explores the history of nationwide notification leading up to the new federal government Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), as well as the Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS) delivery process and message format and content. It also examines the potential impact of IPAWS and CMAS on higher education and suggests actions that colleges and universities may wish to take."

Citation: Latimer, Dewitt. “Deciphering the New Federal Integrated Public Alert and Warning System” (Research Bulletin, Issue 16). Boulder, CO: EDUCAUSE Center for Applied Research, 2009, available from http://www.educause.edu/ecar.

Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning Cancelled

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) issued a warning for the Indian Ocean at 2005 UTC (bulletin number 1). This followed a 7.7 earthquake near the Andaman Islands. A tsunami was predicted to arrive in towns in the islands within 15 minutes, and on the Indian mainland including KAKINADA within an hour, and later: MYANMAR, INDONESIA, THAILAND, BANGLADESH. The JAPAN METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY (JMA) issued a similar bulletin at 2025. The PTWC issued a second bulletin at 2105Z saying a tsunami was generated, but a third bulletin at 2124Z corrected this saying no tsunami had been observed. At 2211Z PTWC cancelled the Tsunami watch. A problem with this process is the difference in times and details between the Japanese and US warnings. The JMA seems to issue fewer, later and less detailed bulletins.

Australian Tsunami Warning Issued

The Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre issued a Land Warning for Lord Howe Island at 10:45 PM EST on 15 July 2009 and a Marine Warning for much of south east Australia. This followed an earthquake off the south of New Zealand at 0923Z 15 JUL 2009. The media were requested to use the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) for Lord Howe Island, but not mainland Australia.

At 12:14 AM EST on Thursday 16 July 2009 threat for Lord Howe Island was downgraded to a Marine Warning and use of the SEWS cancelled. One anomaly with this was that the message for Lord Howe Island (IDY68035) used different text to those for the mainland (IDY68028). The mainland messages said "Marine Warning", whereas the Lord Howe Island message did not contain that phrase. This may seem a minor point, but a lack of use of standard wording can cause dangerous misunderstandings.

Unlike the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, the Australian Centre does not appear to provide a public archive of issued messages, so I have included two in this posting for research purposes.

For a discussion of warning systems see my "National Bushfire Warning System", Seminar, College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU, Canberra, 16 April 2009.

** Land and Marine Threat Tsunami Warning is current for Lord Howe Island. **

THERE IS A LAND AND MARINE TSUNAMI WARNING CURRENT FOR LORD HOWE ISLAND.

IDY68034
Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology

MEDIA:
PLEASE USE STANDARD EMERGENCY WARNING SIGNAL (SEWS)
TOP PRIORITY FOR IMMEDIATE AND FREQUENT BROADCAST
********************************************************************************

TSUNAMI WARNING NUMBER 3 FOR LORD HOWE ISLAND
Issued by the Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre (JATWC) at
10:45 PM EST on Wednesday 15 July 2009

********************************************************************************

TSUNAMI THREAT TO LOW-LYING COASTAL AREAS AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

********************************************************************************
SUMMARY:

Tsunami warning for LORD HOWE ISLAND.

An undersea earthquake of magnitude 7.9 (Latitude 45.960S Longitude 166.470E )
has occurred at 07:22 PM EST on Wednesday 15 July 2009 near OFF W. COAST OF
S. ISLAND, N.Z..

For low-lying coastal areas there is a threat of MAJOR LAND INUNDATION,
FLOODING, DANGEROUS WAVES AND STRONG OCEAN CURRENTS for several hours from
09:30 pm (EST) Wednesday.

People in affected areas are strongly advised by the NSW STATE EMERGENCY
SERVICE to go to higher ground or at least one kilometre inland.

For all threatened areas, people are advised to get out of the water and move
away from the immediate water’s edge.

Next update will be issued by 11:45 PM EST on Wednesday 15 July 2009

For latest and further information call 1300 TSUNAMI (1300 878 6264) or visit
www.bom.gov.au

********************************************************************************
DETAILS:

TSUNAMI THREAT TO LOW-LYING COASTAL AREAS
A threat of MAJOR LAND INUNDATION, FLOODING, DANGEROUS WAVES AND STRONG OCEAN
CURRENTS exists for several hours from 09:30 pm (EST) Wednesday.

COMMUNITY RESPONSE ADVICE FROM THE NSW STATE EMERGENCY SERVICE:

- The NSW STATE EMERGENCY SERVICE has ordered the evacuation of low-lying parts
of coastal towns and villages.

- People are strongly advised to go to higher ground, at least ten metres
above sea level, or if possible move at least one kilometre away from all
beaches and the water's edge of harbours and coastal estuaries.

- Take only essential items that you can carry including important papers,
family photographs and medical needs.

- It may be in your own interests to walk to safety if possible to avoid
traffic jams.

- If you cannot leave the area take shelter in the upper storey of a sturdy
brick or concrete multi-storey building.

- Boats in harbours, estuaries or shallow coastal water should return to
shore. Secure your boat and move away from the waterfront.

- Vessels already at sea should stay offshore in deep water until further
advised.

- Do not go to the coast to watch the tsunami, as there is the possibility of
dangerous, localised land inundation of the immediate foreshore.

- Check that your neighbours have received this advice.

CAUTION:
Tsunami waves are more powerful than the same size beach waves, with the first
wave not necessarily being the largest.

Low-level effects may be observed in neighbouring coastal areas. People are
advised to take care.

TSUNAMI SOURCE:
An undersea earthquake of magnitude 7.9 (Latitude 45.960S Longitude 166.470E )
has occurred at 07:22 PM EST on Wednesday 15 July 2009 off W. COAST OF S.
ISLAND, N.Z.

Sea level observations have confirmed a tsunami has been generated.

Tsunami has been observed at Spring Bay in TAS at 10:05pm and at Port Kembla in
NSW at 10:06pm.

The NEXT UPDATE will be issued by 11:45 PM EST on Wednesday 15 July 2009

FOR LATEST AND FURTHER INFORMATION:
Call 1300 TSUNAMI (1300 878 6264) or visit www.bom.gov.au

FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE:
Call the NSW STATE EMERGENCY SERVICE on 132 500

********************************************************************************

EST = Eastern Standard Time
CST = Central Standard Time = EST - 30 minutes
WST = Western Standard Time = EST - 2 hours

The JATWC is operated by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and Geoscience
Australia
********************************************************************************

** Marine Threat Tsunami Warning is current for Norfolk Island. **

THERE IS A MARINE TSUNAMI WARNING CURRENT FOR NORFOLK ISLAND.

IDY68035
Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology

MEDIA:
NO USE OF STANDARD EMERGENCY WARNING SIGNAL (SEWS)
TOP PRIORITY FOR IMMEDIATE AND FREQUENT BROADCAST
********************************************************************************

TSUNAMI WARNING NUMBER 3 FOR NORFOLK ISLAND
Issued by the Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre (JATWC) at
01:47 AM NFT on Thursday 16 July 2009

********************************************************************************

TSUNAMI THREAT TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

********************************************************************************
SUMMARY:

Tsunami warning for the marine environment of NORFOLK ISLAND.

An undersea earthquake of magnitude 7.9 (Latitude 45.960S Longitude 166.470E )
has occurred at 07:22 PM EST on Wednesday 15 July 2009 off W. COAST OF S.
ISLAND, N.Z.

Possibility of DANGEROUS WAVES, STRONG OCEAN CURRENTS AND SOME LOCALISED
OVERFLOW ONTO THE IMMEDIATE FORESHORE from now until 2:30am local time
Thursday.

Although major evacuations are not required, people are advised to get out of
the water and move away from the immediate water's edge.

Next update will be issued by 02:47 AM NFT on Thursday 16 July 2009

For latest and further information call 1300 TSUNAMI (1300 878 6264) or visit
www.bom.gov.au

********************************************************************************
DETAILS:

A threat of DANGEROUS WAVES, STRONG OCEAN CURRENTS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME
LOCALISED OVERFLOW ONTO THE IMMEDIATE FORESHORE exists from now until 2:30am
local time Thursday.

COMMUNITY RESPONSE ADVICE FROM THE NORFOLK ISLAND POLICE :

- While major evacuations are not required, people are advised to get out of
the water and move away from the immediate water's edge of harbours, coastal
estuaries, rock platforms and beaches.

- Boats in harbours, estuaries or shallow coastal water should return to
shore. Secure your boat and move away from the waterfront.

- Vessels already at sea should stay offshore in deep water until further
advised.

- Do not go to the coast to watch the tsunami, as there is the possibility of
dangerous, localised flooding of the immediate foreshore.

- Check that your neighbours have received this advice.

CAUTION:
Tsunami waves are more powerful than the same size beach waves, with the first
wave not necessarily being the largest.

Low-level effects may be observed in neighbouring coastal areas. People are
advised to take care.

TSUNAMI SOURCE:
An undersea earthquake of magnitude 7.9 (Latitude 45.960S Longitude 166.470E )
has occurred at 07:22 PM EST on Wednesday 15 July 2009 near OFF W. COAST OF
S. ISLAND, N.Z..

Sea level observations have confirmed a tsunami has been generated.

Tsunami has been observed at Spring Bay in TAS at 10:05pm and at Port Kembla
in NSW at 10:06pm.

Tsunami threat levels are expected to gradually decrease from 2:30am local time
Thursday.

The NEXT UPDATE will be issued by 02:47 AM NFT on Thursday 16 July 2009

FOR LATEST AND FURTHER INFORMATION:
Call 1300 TSUNAMI (1300 878 6264) or visit www.bom.gov.au

FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE:
Call the NORFOLK ISLAND POLICE on 977

********************************************************************************

EST = Eastern Standard Time
CST = Central Standard Time = EST - 30 minutes
WST = Western Standard Time = EST - 2 hours

The JATWC is operated by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and Geoscience
Australia
********************************************************************************

Victorian Internet Bushfire Warnings

A Proposed Interim Report of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission was presented by the Counsel Assisting on 2 July 2009. The draft report in a 63 page PDF document (536 kbytes). Several of the key findings and recommendations relate to the use of the Internet, the web and other ICT.

The commission has done a very thorough and thoughtful job in collecting, analysis and collation of a large amount of information and making sensible relevant recommendations. The recommendations for having a single bushfire emergency web site and using visual as well as text based information and to be designed to function during periods of extreme demand are key. For several years I have been teaching students of the Australian National University how to design emergency web sites.

One criticism I would have of the recommendations which relate to the use of ICT is that they are made peace meal, under the various topics. A key problem which this therefore does not address is the peace meal nature of the resulting systems. What is needed is one system which is used to prepare one consistent collection on bushfire which can be disseminated using different technology to different people.

As an example the commission recommends that warnings be read on air on the ABC, but I suggest that these warnings should also be available via the ABC's web site and particularly their mobile web site and via the RSS and other feed systems the ABC uses.

Also while the commission recommends one single, multi‐agency bushfire information website for Victoria, in my opinion, this does not go far enough. Bushfire is not the only form of emergency which Victoria is subject to. Therefore the Victorian government should provide one emergency information website for all forms of life threatening emergencies in Victoria, including bus fires.

One issued raised by a submission to the inquiry, but not taken up by the commission in its recommendations is the resilience of the proposed National Broadband Network in an emergency. As I have pointed out, the government has not set does not have use of the NBN in an emergency as a priority. If the NBN is not designed to operate during a power failure or in other emergencies, as it beings to replace conventional PSTN telephones, the risk to the public will increase as a result.

2.2. Construction, content of warnings
Key findings ...

(e) CFA bushfire warnings are assigned three “levels”: Awareness, Alert and Urgent Threat. Ideally, each such warning is posted (in a timely fashion) to the CFA website, read aloud on ABC radio and provided to the VBIL. The evidence before the Royal Commission is that on 7 February 2009 this did not always occur in a timely fashion. ...

2.3. Specific methods of delivering warnings.

2.3.1. Single, multi‐agency bushfire information website for Victoria.
Key findings

(a) The public rely on fire agency websites for accurate and up to date information about fires in their area. ...

(b) Currently CFA and DSE maintain separate websites. CFA and DSE are working to present bushfire information on a single website. ...

Proposed recommendations

(a) A single, multi‐agency bushfire information website for Victoria be established and operational for the 2009‐2010 fire season.
(b) The website must provide timely, accurate and up to date bushfire information posted by the fire agencies, that is consistent with the bushfire information being delivered through other modes, including the VBIL and ABC radio. The website must be designed to communicate information quickly and simply, using visual as well as text based information and have the capacity to function during periods of extreme demand.
(c) The website be designed to allow Incident Control Centres (ICCs) to post bushfire information directly to the website.

2.3.2. Standard Emergency Warning Signal
Key findings
(a) The Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) is not itself a ”warning”. Rather, it is a distinctive alert tone or signal broadcast prior to warnings for major emergencies. It is designed to “alert listeners/viewers of radio/television that an official emergency announcement is about to be made concerning an actual or potential emergency which has the potential to affect them”. ...

(b) The current protocol for the use of SEWS requires the control agency to request the police to authorise its use. Victoria Police (via the Divisional Emergency Response Coordinator) then sends an “Emergency Warning Notice” to the media. On receipt of that formal request to issue a warning, the media are expected to broadcast the warning message, preceded by the distinctive “SEWS tone” for 15 seconds.
(c) SEWS was not used on 7 February 2009 in Victoria. Its use is not referred to in the Emergency Management Manual. Indeed, SEWS has not been regularly used in Victoria, because of concerns that it can be overused and thereby become ineffective and the possibility that it might cause “confusion”. ...
(d) There is no research to suggest that use or “overuse” of SEWS has caused any significant confusion or inconvenience in the community. ...
(e) The Commonwealth has been considering a “relaunch” of SEWS, however it ceased that work in anticipation of the findings of this Royal Commission. ...
(f) SEWS is useful in alerting people to the content of a warning message to follow, and it has been used in South Australia (since 2005) for that very purpose. ...

Proposed recommendations

(a) The Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) must be used in Victoria to precede each Urgent Threat message in relation to a bushfire and in all circumstances where lives are at risk by reason of bushfire.
(b) The Emergency Management Manual Victoria should be amended to provide that:
(i) the use of SEWS is to precede each urgent threat message issued in relation to a bushfire;
(ii) the use of SEWS is required in all circumstances when lives are at risk; and
(iii) the use of SEWS may be authorised during bushfires by the Chief Officer of the CFA or the Chief Officer of DSE.
(c) The State Government to commence an intensive education campaign to inform the Victorian community that the distinctive SEWS signal will be used before each Urgent Threat message for bushfires and in all circumstances where lives are at risk by reason of bushfire.
(d) The ABC, CFA and DSE to implement a streamlined process for the use of SEWS on ABC radio and television.
(e) The CFA and DSE to invite commercial operators to enter into a Memoranda of Understanding in relation to the dissemination of bushfire warning messages and a process for the use of SEWS by those operators.

2.3.3. Community Information and Warning Systems and Dissemination of Warnings
Key findings

(a) In 2005, the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner (OESC), in partnership with Telstra, ran a successful trial of an opt in land line telephony based community warning system in two communities in Victoria. ...

(b) Since the 2005 trial, Victoria’s position has been that a national community information and warning system should be implemented. Victoria has advocated this position forcefully at the highest levels, including in communications between the Premier and the Minister for Police and the Commonwealth. ...

(c) The use of a nationally consistent community information warning system drawing on such technology is supported in an AFAC Discussion Paper: “A National Systems Approach to Community Warnings”, 3 June 2009. ...

(d) On 2 October 2008, COAG formally noted that “A nationally – consistent community emergency warning system will enhance the current capability to provide timely and accurate warnings in the event of emergencies and provide useful information and advice on individual and community responses. COAG has requested that all remaining tasks, including a cost – benefit analysis, be completed by the end of 2008”. ...

(e) But the period between 2006 and 2009 was largely characterised by delay. There was extended debate between Commonwealth departments about the need for legislative amendment to facilitate access to the Integrated Public Numbers Database (IPND). ...

(f) On 3 December 2008, the Attorney General wrote to the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy stating: “As noted by COAG, a telephony based warning system has the potential to save lives”. ...

(g) During the period 2004 to 2009, the Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital Economy maintained the view that changes to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) were necessary to permit access by emergency services to the IPND. ...

(h) The delay was also in part due to the fact that until after the 2009 fires, the States and the Commonwealth had not agreed on the appropriate model for a national system. ...

(i) In March 2009, the necessary amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) were made. ...

(j) On 2 March 2009, after the February 2009 fires, and before the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) amendments were made, Victoria Police and the OESC determined to issue a mass warning message via SMS in order to warn of predicted severe weather.

Telstra was instrumental in the arrangements for the dissemination of the message. A review conducted in relation to this event revealed a high rate of recall by recipients and “success” in terms of the message delivery. ...

(k) The SMS message was able to be sent by Telstra because access to the IPND was not required, as Telstra simply sent the message to its customers using their billing addresses. Out of "an abundance of caution", Telstra was also supplied with a certificate from Victoria Police which stated that the message was necessary to be sent by reason of a "serious and imminent threat" to life. Although this certificate echoes the wording of the exception in s287 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), Telstra did not in fact purport to rely on that section. Indeed, Mr Consolo accepted in evidence that Telstra has always possessed the capacity to send such an SMS message to its customers, though this message offers no "geo‐coding" function. Mr Esplin, in his evidence, noted that the agreement of carriers to take such a step was, in his view, unlikely to have been obtained prior to the events of 7 February 2009. ...

(l) On 30 April 2009, following a COAG meeting, the Commonwealth announced that COAG had agreed to implement a national telephone emergency warning system. The first stage (which COAG said would be in place by October 2009) will provide warnings in the form of recorded voice messages and SMS messages to the billing addresses of landline and mobile phones. A second stage of the system that would permit sending of
phone messages based on the location of the telephone handset is to be investigated. ...

(m) Despite the development of this new technology, it is clear that multiple methods of dissemination of warnings should continue to be used for the following reasons:

(i) members of the community may obtain information in a variety of ways including websites, telecommunications, radio and informal networks – and tend to like to confirm information received with other sources; and
(ii) it is advisable to preserve multiple modes of disseminating warnings (including old technology such as sirens, door to door visits, radio and new technology such as SMS, official websites, informal websites, Twitter, Facebook) to reach the broadest possible audience and to guard against failure of any single mode of communication. ...

(a) The Commonwealth and COAG should ensure that implementation of stage one of the new national emergency warning system prior to bushfire season 2009‐2010.
(b) The State of Victoria should be an active participant in the development, implementation and operation of the new national emergency warning system.
(c) The State of Victoria should immediately commence a program of community education in order to ensure that Victorians are well informed about the proper use of and response to the use of the new national emergency warning system, particularly in the event of bushfire, prior to the 2009‐2010 season. Such community education program to draw on the experiences of the “Community Information and Warning System: The Report of The Trial and Evaluation”, OESC (2006) ...
(d) If by September 2009, it appears unlikely that the first phase of the national system will be operational, the State of Victoria to make representations to the Commonwealth Government with a view to securing a commitment that the system will be available at least in Victoria’s Bushfire Risk Zones by bushfire season 2009‐2010.
(e) Multiple means of disseminating warning message should be retained including the continued use of ABC broadcasts, a single multi agency website (see proposed recommendation 2.3.1) and sirens where adopted by particular communities (see proposed recommendation 2.3.4).

2.3.5. Publication of Fire Danger Index forecasts
Key findings

(a) The Bureau of Meteorology routinely forecasts the Forest Fire Danger Index and the Grass Fire Danger Index (collectively the Fire Danger Index or FDI) and provides these forecasts to the fire agencies. ...
(b) The FDI forecasts are not included in the general weather forecasts posted on the Bureau’s website or distributed to the media. They are made available to the public only in the fire weather forecasts posted on the Bureau’s website on the afternoon before the day in question. ...
(c) A number of lay witnesses wanted to see the FDI forecasts published more widely. ...

Proposed recommendations
(a) The Bureau of Meteorology include the Forest Fire Danger Index and Grass Fire Danger Index in its fire weather warnings and general weather forecasts posted on its website and distributed to the media. ...

4.9. Application to those in places other than homes – e.g. schools, nursing homes, hospitals

Proposed Recommendations – stay or go (key findings 4.1‐4.9)

(ii) that before the commencement of the 2009 ‐ 2010 fire season they be revised and enhanced to clearly convey the following ...

(M) Advice about when to leave, incorporating a cascading series of triggers
(noting that a warning may not be received and should not be relied upon)
namely ...
• When you are advised to be on alert in relation to a fire that has
commenced. This requires that you pay attention to fire information sources (ABC, fire agency website) on days of total fire ban and extreme fire risk. ...

8. Detection of fires
8.1. Early detection, mapping and prediction of fire spread
Key findings ...

(n) Threat messages issued concerning the Kilmore East fire prior to 18.00 on 7 February 2009 made no reference to the anticipated frontal change. ...

(p) Kilmore ICC authorised at 16.10 on 7 February 2009 release of threat message warning communities from Kinglake to Strath Creek of fire. That message did not appear on the CFA website. ...

(r) Narbethong was the subject of a threat message on the DSE website at 16.45 on 7 February 2009 and Marysville was the subject of a threat message on the DSE website at 17.15 on 7 February 2009. ...

19.2. Communications infrastructure

Key findings

(a) Warnings, both formal and informal, are communicated by a range of means including mobile and fixed line telephones, radio, television and the internet. Members of the public need to be able to contact emergency services in an emergency.

Communications within and between emergency services agencies are vital to an effective and co‐ordinated emergency response. A reliable and robust communications infrastructure is therefore essential.

(b) The Commission has heard evidence that indicates that Victoria’s communications infrastructure was placed under great stress on 7 February, and that there were difficulties in communicating with and within emergency services, and generally. ...

(c) To date the Commission has heard evidence from the ABC, ACE Radio Broadcasters, Telstra, ESTA, DSE, CFA and Victoria Police in respect of public radio and television, fixed and mobile telephone networks, managed radio networks and the operation of emergency call services. Some of these communications media performed well on 7 February, others less so. ...

(d) The Commission has also heard evidence that indicates that communications in some parts of Victoria are less than optimal under normal conditions. ...

Proposed recommendations
(a) No further recommendation is proposed. Victoria’s communications infrastructure will be the subject of evidence in future hearings. ...

From: Proposed Interim Report of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, Counsel Assisting, 2 July 2009.