This chapter will analyse the complexities of the consultative process between 1988 and 1995 that developed between Telecom and representative groups for people with disabilities. Key events in the dealings between the corporate body and people with disabilities are chronologically placed and explained from specific actors' positions. The strategies, positions, and perceptions of various parties are analysed in terms of the different structures and discourses that influence normative views of telecommunication policy in relation to people with disability.
The Telecom Australia Consumer Councils (TACC) introduced a significant chapter in the unfolding story of telecommunications services for people with disabilities and their ability to influence policy. The objectives of this section are to describe, explain and analyse:
A disastrous by-election for the Government in 1988 and Telecom's unsuccessful bid in the same year to gain community support for timed local calls were catalysts for the TACC process (pers. comms. annon; CTNPA, 1997; Vanstone, HOS, 16 February, 1988, 50). The political fall-out surrounding the January Adelaide by-election that saw Labor lose the seat to Liberal and the Government suffer a nine percent swing against them was linked to Telcom's plans to institute timed local calls (Davies, 1990, 55; HOS, 16 February, 1988, 50). Both the Government and Telecom came uder criticism from the Coalition Opposition for their handling of the issue. Senator Amanda Vanstone used the appointment of Senator Nick Bolkus from a South Australian electorate, to Minister for Consumer Affairs and Minister Assisting the Treasurer for Prices as an opportunity to apply pressure on the Labor Government and Telecom:
I congratulate him on his appointment. If the newspapers are any indication, it was a long, hard and close battle for him. I refer to the recent Adelaide by-election when the issue of timed local calls played a part in the massive rejection of the Labor Government..., is the Government concerned about the cost of telephone calls to Australians?...Does the Minister accept that many people cannot pay the high cost of Telecom's inefficiency? (Vanstone, HOS, 16 February 1988, 59).
Bolkus refused to be drawn into the issue particularly because timed local calls was a responsibility of Senator Gareth Evans, the Minister for the Department of Transport and Communication. Evans was questioned about the issue six days later as Senator Bronwyn Bishop probed for the costs associated with promoting time-charged phone-calls to which he undertook to obtain an answer. Evans later responded with the figure based on advice from Telecom. In addition he claimed:
The amount spent by Telecom on seeking community input to its proposed consultation process on the timing of local calls was aprroximately $608, 900 which was expended on task preparation, work, printing and media coverage (Evans, 13 April, 1988, 1522).
Evans reference to proposed consultation process followed by the activities on which the money was spent pointed to a clash of consultative intent and the expenditure on promotional activities. The following week Bishop took the opportunity to address the anomaly which Evans accepted:
I readily acknowledge that that was not one of the more successful community consultation processes of all time, unless one adopts as one's measuring stick the achievement of an early decisive result (Evans, HOS, 15 April, 1988, 1592).
As well as an electoral setback, Labor suffered a political roasting over the issue. In addition, an adequate process of consultation was lacking as evidenced by the hostile community attitude to timed-local calls. The timed-local calls issue also revealed Telecoms' hasty willingness to implement radical policy changes. According to one senior ex-employee who wishes to remain anonymous, the issue of timed local calls moved quickly from an idea to policy:
The timed local calls plan began as just a model as we were looking at various pricing options. (One of the staff) wrote a paper and explored some options. When senior management heard of the figures they got... excited . Then it went to the board... (of directors) and soon everyone was involved but no-one was in control... Then everything was politicised (annon.pers. comms., 1997).
The person desribed a climate of control increasingly overseen by economic rationalists who were keen to capitalise on new ideas which above all else would reflect cost-efficiencies and profit-maximisation (annon.pers. comms., 1997). A similar climate was observed to operate within DOTAC (pers. comms. Annon., 1997). When details of the planned introduction of time-local calls were announced, Telstra received widespread criticism from consumer organisations and groups representing people with disabilities (Johnston, 1995; pers. comms. PDPIA, 1997; Annon., 1997). According to its President, DPI (A) played a chief role in opposing TLCs and in doing so secured its role in the TACC process:
My understanding of the catalyst that sparked the whole TACC business was an abortive attempt by Telecom to introduce timed local calls and one of the strongest and most effective advocates against that was the disability sector, of which I was head at the time. And so, a) the the whole thing was catapulted into a political issue by the community back-lash towards the introduction to introduce timed-local calls; and, b)because of the prominence of the disability sector in that back-lash, .. that's how we (DPI (A)) got a seat at the table ..plus the fact that I knew quite well and worked very closely with ... the architect of TACC (pers. comms. PDPIA, 1997).
Apart from general consumer concern, people with a disability were particularly vocal in their opposition to timed-local calls because on average they spent longer on the telephone than other consumers as a result of slower motor and/or vocal responses. Therefore timed local calls would financially discriminate against people with disabilities. The President of DPI(A) also credits the ex Executive Director of the Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations (AFCO) as being the architect of TACC and describes him affectionately as an ``Australian Ralph Nader who ran every consumer organisation that you could think of'' (pers. comms. PDPIA, 1997). Abott (1995, 53) observes that AFCO represents the national political interests of eighty state, national and product-specific consumer organisations. With a strong national affiliation of consumer groups AFCO is in a strong position to determine opinions among their constituents that could have political consequences for governments and organisations. According to the ex Executive Director of AFCO, previously AFCO had met resistance to its ``gentle'' lobbying of Telecom to create a consumer platform with the national carrier to voice community concern with isssues such as billing and service delivery (pers. comms., EDAFCO, 1997). However, the timed local calls issue and subsequent political fall-out created a more receptive environment within Telecom for a consulative process with consumers:
We were concerned that Telecom's decision making process was not particularly well-informed by consumer views in general...the timed local calls thing was the real catalyst. I think there had been letters over the years to Telecom and relevant departments to which both had been relatively closed. There was a basic philosophical battle that had to be fought that you could have community organisations speaking on behalf of the consumers in general... And then the Adelaide by-election happened and they suddenly came to the view...or voices within Telecom suddenly listened that there ought to be a better way in managing the consumer relations process. My recollection is that Ted Benjamin was quite critical ... and he came and saw me and said we ought to establish some sought of consultative council (pers. comms. EDAFCO, 1997).
These observations are informative as they illustrate the interplay of discourses and significant events which collectively impact on the telecommunication s policy arena. Despite AFCOs efforts in lobbying for a consumer consultative process, neither government or Telecom were particularly interested until the Adelaide by-election political fall-out. However their previous lobbying, had met sympathetic responses from some within Telecom who were able to pressure senior management for changes in the wake of the surprise adverse public reaction to the proposal of the introduction of TLCs. Once plans for the TACC were underway, the ex Executive Director of AFCO observed that Telecom greeted the process enthusiastically:
Telecom then really took it up and certainly the people who were brought into it really got enthused about it and devoted a lot of time into it. They also devoted a lot of time to educating us, the community sector representatives, on the issues from their perspective ...on the engineering, economic and commercial issues and so on (pers. comms. EDAFCO, 1997).
This emphasis on Telecom's educational activities on the community representatives is significant in that it displays an attempt to influence their worldviews and perhaps more importantly legitimise Telecom's policy positions. The interaction of worldviews and their effect on policy is discussed in further detail in later.
Although it appears that the TACC process resulted from political embarrassment which led to the Communication Ministers criticism of existing community consultative arrangements, no official link between the events is established. In other words the Minister did not demand, at least on record TACC's establishment. It is possible that the Government wanted to be seen to be at arm's length from the issue. The ex Executive Director of AFCO observes that the Government showed little interest in the operation and activities of the TACCs (pers. comms. EDAFCO, 1997).
The TACCs began in a climate of increasing deregulation of Government monopolies which relied upon market mechanisms. Wide-ranging reforms were announced in May 1988 by the Commonwealth Government which would see the introduction of Government Business Enterprises, one of which would be Telecom. Terry Cutler, at the time Telecom's Executive Director of Corporate Strategy is described by the ex Executive Director of AFCO as a strategic thinker and who saw that Telecom would be better positioned to negotiate with Government if it had a strong consumer organisation affiliation (pers. comms. EDAFCO, 1997). Consequently Telecom could possibly use the TACCs to diffuse pressure from Governments and potentially claim a lobbying partner.
Over the following months AFCO and Telecom met with other major consumer organisations and formed an interim Telecom Consumer Consultative Council until the permanent Telecom Australia Consumer Council began in June 1989 (Johnston, 1995, 42). Craig Johnston (1995) writing for the Public Interest Advocacy Centre provides a comprehensive overview of the composition and function of TACCs. The TACC began with nine representative non-government organisations (NGOs) and six Telecom representatives (Johnston, 1995). The council was overseen by joint chairs; the Executive Director of AFCO represented the Consumer organisations and Terry Cutler represented Telecom. The President of DPI(A) represented people with disablities.
Another development in the consultative process in 1989 was the development of Telecom Regional Consumer Councils (TRCCs) which were established in each of the states and territories and focused on regional rather than national issues. The TRCCs are regionally based and create a national network of consumer representation forums which report back to the main council in Melbourne. Initially meetings were held quarterly but since 1994 changed to three times a year (Johnston, 1995, 44). Telecom and later Telstra provided funding for the TACCs and TRCCs to function.[13] Funding included financial assistance for travel, accomodation, sitting time and other expenses (Johnston, 1995, 45).
The Consumers' Telecommunications Network (CTN) formed in 1989 is another significant contribution AFCO made to the consumer consultative process. CTN acts as a co-ordinating body between all the Telstra consumer council. In addition CTN fulfills a work function in alerting Telstra to issues requiring attention and also lobbies Telstra and governments in access and equity issues for consumers (Johnston, 1997; pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997). CTN also relies on Telstra for most of its funding.
The TACCs became cultural learning forums of interaction between consumer groups and Telecom middle management. All interviewed participants in the forums were unanimous in their praise of the cultural value of the TACCs as arenas where people were exposed to differing worldviews and social practices (pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997, PNFBCA, 1997, AADPA, 1997, PDPIA, 1997).
A CTN Policy Adviser described the TACC as the most progressive consultative arrangement between consumers and a large corporation in Australia at the time (pers. comms., 1997). Community actors in the TACC also commend the genuine attempt by Telecom middle management to come to terms with issues of disability (pers. comms. CTNPA; PNFBCA;1997) However the attention to the cultural implications of disability were gradual and a result of continual exposure to different worldviews and discourses. The issue of cultural exposure by Telecom personnel and their changes in attitude to people with disability is important because it illustrates a fundamental principle in the consultative policy process. The principle that middle management became advocates for change in policy and subsequently created tension between themselves and senior management who hadn't been exposed to the cultures of disability is illustrated by example in this chapter.
The Telecom Disability Programs Services Manager at the time of the introduction of the TACC process explored the technological opportunities for people with disabilities and engaged in comprehensive work for solutions (pers. comms. CTNPA; TMPP, 1997).
1n 1990, the TACC formed the Disability Servives Consultative Committee to function as a working group specifically to investigate the telecommunication requirements of people with disabilities and to liase with the larger council. This followed the production of a paper advocating such a move by Christopher Newell, who in late 1989 had taken over from the President of DPI(A) as the nominee of DPI(A) on the Council. Almost a year later, Newell was joined on the main TACC almost a year later by a Policy Adviser, representing the Australian Association of the Deaf (pers. comms. AADPA, 1997).
AAD formed in 1977 as a consumer voice for the Australian Deafness Council which was an umbrella organisation for a number of national deaf organisations. AAD had the unique position in the consumer movement of having a historically strong cultural base in a representative disability group yet also had established rights and consumer strategies(pers. comms. AADPA, 1997). For several years the group had been lobbying Telecom actively for equal access to telecommunications services through letters and meetings with Telecom management (pers. comms. AADPA).
In 1991, Telecom's disability service manager released a report, Telecommunications For People With Disabilities (1991) for internal and limited external distribution among the Government and people with disabilites. The report came to be known as the Red Book (after the book's cover). The term is significant because community group representatives interviewed commonly referred to it by that title. (pers.comm. AADPA; CTNPA; CTNPA2, 1997). It is argued that the generic reference, which omitted Telecom's ownership, politicised the report. In addition, the AAD Policy Adviser contributed to the work and it may be argued that the term Red Book came to be used as a trope of inferred ownership by people with disabilities.
Among other things the report (Telecom, 1991) provided a comparative analysis of international approaches to TTY provision for profoundly deaf people. The report gives extensive detail of the costs involved in providing TTY equipment and establishing a national relay service. The disability services manager presented the report in a climate of continual cost-cutting threatened by the immanent arrival of a competing carrier (CTNPA2 and CTNPA, 1994; pers.comm. AADPA, 1997). According to some community representatives, the changing Telecom environment and commercial uncertainties meant that senior management were less than enthusiastic to give much attention to its contents and recommendations (pers. comms. AADPA, 1997; CTNPA, 1997).
The report's first page contains an enlightening paragraph that explains and contextualises Telecom policy in an uncertain evolving competitive and political environment. The third paragraph summarises: a) Telecom's policy to TTYs and other extra equipment not covered by existing concessions; and b) the reasons for the policy; and c) their commitment to advise on technical issues:
1.3 In April 1991 the Government announced that with the advent of another carrier in competition with Telecom, any extension of telecommunication concessions and facilities for PWD would be a matter for decision, implementation and funding by the Departments of Social Security, and Health , Housing and Community Services. These departments have been required by the Government to advise on the position. Telecom is able to assist the departments by the provision of data and expertise (Telecom Australia, 1991, 1).
The report refers to a media release in April in which the then-Minister for Transport and Communications, Kim Beazley announced that the welfare system would be used to meet the needs of people with disabilities in a deregulated telecommunications environment (Newell, 1991, 73). Historically there have been difficulties in the coordinated efforts of welfare departments and Telecom (Newell, 1991, 74; pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997). The Department of Social Security came under criticism for its administration of a telephone voucher scheme. Senator Patterson claimed that many ineligible people were rorting the system. Telecom and the DSS shared responsibility for the scheme which provided rental concessions for people with disabilities and pensioners (HOS, 18 December, 5870, 1990).
With competition immanent, Telecom was reluctant to bear financial responsibility for increasing their range of services for people with disabilities particularly given the Communications Ministers' reassurance that DSS would provide them. In addition, Newell makes the observation that in a competitive enviornment it would be unfair for Telecom to be forced to fund provided concessional equipment for a particular group which could then use another carrier's service because it offered competive rates (Newell, 1991, 74).
Arguably, Telecom's belief that services for people with disabilities essentially were concessions reinforced its perception of the central role that Government and in particular the Department of Community Services and Health were expected to play in service provision. Rights advocates and consumer groups perceived that welfare-based support systems were based on charity and medical models of disability and disempowered people with disability (pers. comms. PDPIA; PNFBCA; AADPA; 1997). Apart from the threat of political disenfranchisment, welfare-based funding posed financial risk to disability community groups (pers. comms. PDPIA, 1997). In addition, apart from charity organisations, welfare funds generally come from Government consolidated revenue from Departments such as Community Services and Health. Funding received on a welfare basis is subject to budget cuts at the whim of governments.
The division between USOs and CSOs in the Telecommujnications Act (1991) were disappointments for community and consumer groups in terms of access and equity. Community obligations became social welfare issues and according to Goggin and Wilson , represented a lost opportunity to link them to Telecom's cross--subsidy arrangements (1993, 14). Once they are made reliant on federal budgets, social obligations to service can be delayed indefinitely:
The government inaugurated a bifurcation between universal service defined in geographical terms, which would become an industry responsibility, and CSOs, conceived as social welfare responsibilities, to be met by the government through consolidated revenue. The problems inherent in this policy decion have been illustrated that at the time of writing the government had still not met its so-called CSO responsibilities (the access and affordability aspects of universal service) (1993, 15).
TTYs for profoundly deaf people are an example of a CSO that waited on the fiscal backburner until legislative and lobbying pressures demanded recognition and action from the Government and Telstra.
The market-defining nature of CSOs also influenced the policies within the the welfare departments. Contemporaneously to the TACC introduction Dr Neal Blewett, the Minister of Community Services and Health streamlined Commonwealth funding for organisations and service providers for people with disabilities. These groups were now expected to carry out basic market work to support claims for Government assistance (Breakthrough, 56, 1989). Similarly the notion of client was replaced by consumer (pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997). According to a CTN Policy Adviser, in the minds of Telecom senior management people with disabilities fitted awkwardly into the consumer discourse:
As Telecom in the late eighties was becoming a GBE we had a shift in mentality from the corporation from talking about subscibers to... customers. There was still a sense where people with disabilities were not exactly customers. They weren't seen as people who paid for a service and could expect levels of service (pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997).
These comments indicate that people with disabilities had to be positioned as customers within the new competitive environment who had reason to expect access to telecommunications service. Community advocacy groups also realised the imperative in the changing political climate to decentralised government services to strategically use human rights discourses which emphasised the right to essential services for individuals with a disability. Groups such as AAD and CTN used rights and consumer discourses in their lobbying efforts to position people with disability as consumers who had citizens' rights of access and equity in telecommunications (pers. comms. AADPA; CTNPA, 1997).
It is argued that politically, people with disabilities were playing catch-up. While notions of the individual were changing in the larger community, many were still fighting for their rights as citizens to be recognised. Political issues were complicated further by dissension among the ranks of people with disabilities. As noted earlier, people with disabilities are not an homogeneous group. Apart from obvious physical dissimilarities, there are also differing cultures among communities. Telecom managers learnt of the different cultural perspectives in their interactions with people with disabilities through the TACC process.
In the first few years of the TACC process, Telecom managers made the error of assuming one group representing a specific disability to be representative of the whole group of people with that disability (pers. comms. PNFBCA; PDPIA, 1997). According to the President of the NFBCA, (1997), Telecom didn't understand the difference between representative organisations and consumer organsations whose office-holders had disabilites:
They would go to the Victorian Association of the Blind or the Royal Blind Society based in Sydney. These are large multi million dollar agencies with vast resources. The CEOs and other senior officers working within them aren't blind and they operate with different priorities and perspectives to us (The National Federation of Blind Citizens of Australia). Put it this way, both CEOs are doing the job...he might be gone tomorrow and I might be gone...but I won't be getting my sight back... We see the passing parade of patron executives and agencies and see the passing parade of public servants. The difference between us all is the proverbial difference between the contribution between the chicken and the pig in producing a breakfast of ham and eggs...for them it's a contribution, for me it's a total commitment (pers. comms. 1997).
These comments are significant as disability is perceived from two differing positions depending on who are the subjects. From the first position the subjects are so-called able-bodied and represents the perceived interests of people with disabilites . In the second the subjects are people with a disability who represent their interests and those of others with similar impairments. Representative organisations traditionally have been in the position to procure political favour due to their vast human and capital resources as a result of support from the wider community and patrons bequeathing property and finances. In addition representative groups'powerful and entrenched position can result from state-wide networks and international affiliations (pers. comms. PNFBCA, 1997).
Due to patron-based funding methods and their organisation structures, large representative groups are inclined to use traditional charity and medical models of disability (pers.comm. PNFBCA, 1997). Consequently these groups and some of the newer rights-based and consumer groups, where people with disabilities hold key positions, often view each other with suspicion (pers. comms. PDPIA, PNFBCA, 1997). The CEO of the National Federation of Blind Citizens of Australia is also critical of blind people who claim to be group representatives but are not aligned to the consumer movement (pers. comms. PNFBCA, 1997). According to the President of the NFBCA, they generally know little on the subject of blindness:
I don't think that there is any of whom I would say, ``Yeah, that's a really good person. They know a lot but it's a pity that they are not with the consumer movement. Frankly my opinion is that they don't know much about blindness. Maybe I take a hard line on that, but I'm usually right (pers. comms. PNFBCA, 1997).
The President of DPI(A) is critical of this perspective and claims that privileging people who use consumer discourses above other perspectives is a dangerous attitude that fragments the solidarity of the rights movement (pers. comms. PDPIA, 1997).
Prior to the introduction of TACC, access to TTYs was an established part of the national agenda for people who were deaf. An example of efforts to mobilise regional support several years earlier among the Deaf Community was found in a Deaf Rights pamphlet. In 1985, the International Year of Youth, the Victorian Deaf Society passed a resolution at a State seminar that:
TTYs shall be made available to all Deaf/ hearing impaired people at costs equal to the hiring of an ordinary telephone (pamphlet, Deaf Rights, 24 June, 1986).
The resolution identified a clear agenda of linking TTY to the standard telecommunications service provision of TCA (1975, section 6(1)). In addition, it is likely that physiological levels of disability were not the subjects in the pamphlet's reference to of Deaf/ hearing impaired . Instead the description is used to indicate cultural affiliation. People with hearing loss represent two distinct groups and separate cultures. Many Australians have experienced minor or profound hearing loss but this does not automatically make them part of the Deaf community.
Most people born deaf identify themselves as a socio-linguistic minority. Many members of the Deaf community as they prefer to be identified do not acknowledge their deafness as a disability. A Capital D on the word Deaf identifies them as a cultural-linguistic group in the same way that Greek is capitalised with a G. The cultural indicator of members of the Deaf community is not the physiological inability to hear, but the use of sign language to communicate.
Australian members of the Deaf community have their own sign language known as Auslan, recognised in the National Languages Policy as a community language (Wilson, 1994, 18). As a recognised community language Auslan assists the transmission of Deaf culture and facilitates the construction of social identity (Wilson, 1994, 18; Newell, 1992, 11). Significantly, the AAD was formed under the auspices of the Australian Society for the Deaf, a large representative umbrella organisation similar to ACROD and the Victorian Society for the Blind. As observed, large representative umbrella organisations have traditionally been dominated by medical and charity models of disability. (pers. comms. AADPA, 1997). However as Newell observes, AAD is a flexible player in terms of social identity construction and is not averse either to claiming disability benefits or alternatively, status as a linguistic minority for strategic advantage (Newell, 1992, 11; pers. comms. PDPIA, 1997).
The fifteen thousand Australians who identify as members of the Deaf community represent a large culturally cohesive group in Australia that could be identified as having a disability (Wilson, 1994, 30). The refusal of the Deaf to join the mainstream disability movement has caused frustration to some. The President of DPI(A)'s (1997) comments indicate the level of dissent that complicated negotiations in the TACC process for people with disabilities:
The TTY issue was tricky in itself and you have to realise that the Deaf community had their own agenda. Some people don't see themselves as having a disability. Some had very controversial points of view...stark raving mad points of view some would say...They didn't care if they had an integrated service availability like we were advocating...we were saying...this needs to be part of your (Telecom's) normal (standard telecommunications) service...but all they (Deaf community) wanted were their needs to be met...They could argue rights as well as anybody, but they just went for what they wanted. Whereas the mainstream disability movement was about integration, the deaf community vote was about, ``we're a separate culture and we want our needs met" (pers. comms., 1997).
While these comments position the Deaf community as self-interested tacticians, he praises the an AAD Policy Adviser as a knowledgable and useful negotiator in the TACC process. However in the early days if advocacy to do with telecommunications up to the end of 1989 the President of DPI(A) attests to tension between the Deaf community and others in the movement. He perceived a cultural fragmentation that the Deaf community brought to the negotiating table while he attempted to coordinate a united lobbying effort (pers. comms. PDPIA, 1997). The AAD Policy Adviser became involved in TACC through the assistance of CTN, part of whose function was to expand the forum (pers. comms. AADPA, 1997).
Interviewees agree that despite the positive atmosphere of TACC, few concrete gains were won for people with disabilities until the Scott v Telstra outcome (pers. comms. CTNPA; EDAFCO; AADPA; PNFBCA; DDPUSO; ASRPB, 1997). tThe ex Executive Director of AFCO observes that while real breakthroughs were achieved in the negotiating process with issues that affected the larger community such as credit management, Telecom was reluctant to give any concessions in their stance on services for people with disabilities (pers. comms. EDAFCO, 1997). According to the President of DPI(A), Telecom perceived that any additional equipment to the standard handset and network should be guided by a user-pays principle:
The issue at hand was that they were all value-added products and one of the things that I was strongest about was that if you have a customer base that includes customers who couldn't use the equipment then whose fault was that? Was it the customers' fault or the inadequacy of the equipment or service being provided by the provider? (pers. comms. 1997).
Due to the success of the lobbying efforts of DPI(A) and CTN some gains were made. Since July 1991 Telstra have provided minor modifications to the standard voice-based telephone such as volume controls, hearing aid couplers and audible alarms at no extra cost to consumers (pers. comms. PDPIA, 1997;CTNPA2, 1994, 17). Previously these products were paid for by consumers. Now, they received them free of charge as a right to facilitate access to a standard telephone service. However in the minds of Telecom management people with disabilities were seen as a non-market. Their perception reinforced charity models of disability in Telecom policy (pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997). The example illustrates the principle that a policy action may be perceived in two different ways which will lead to compromise, capitulation or conflict later.
The President of DPI(A) introduced human rights and consumer discourses that were constant themes of those advocating for extended telecommunications services for people with disabilities. The discourses were a source of contention for Telecom management facing pressure to minimise costs and maximise profit as a result of the organisation becoming a GBE. (pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997). However as the Disability program managers, interacted with consumer groups and people with disability they became more sympathetic to the issues presented (CTNPA pers. comms., 1997). The CTN Policy Adviser describes a process of transformation in Telecom Disability Program Managers:
(At the beginning) they were still stuck I think in a charity model of disability. And then typically what would happen in some sense the Disability manager would form a notion or deeper understanding of people with disabilities in relation to telecommunications (pers. comms. 1997).
These comments indicate a growing awarenss of the rights of people with disability that conflicted with the corporatised direction of Telcom and its commercial priorities. The ex Executive Director of AFCO observed that the TACC process was impeded by the deregulated telecommunications environment:
The timing of competition with deregulation and the duopoly etc was unfortunate for TACC as many in Telecom supported the initiatives for people with disabilities. But in the emerging competitive climate (they) were concerned about costs and (therefore were) not as generous as they could be (pers. comms. EDAFCO, 1997).
Despite the positive atmosphere that surrounded TACC in the early years, for disability consumer representative groups the issues of contention remained. The AAD Policy Adviser remembers introducing the issue of the provision of TTYs constantly at the forums to which senior management would reply that, ``they would get back to that at some later stage'' (pers. comms., AADPA, 1997). Upon reflection, he believes his persistence was useful in that it kept TTYs on the agenda.
Telecom's disability service manager requested the AAD Policy Adviser to work TTYs' use while he was in the United States. He went to the United States as a speaker at a conference on behalf of AAD in 1990. When the disability service manager heard about the conference, he requested the AAD Policy Adviser to obtain precise figures of TTY usage, the funding system and other hard data related to the costs of providing the equipment. Later that same year the manager also studied the issues in the USA, UK, Sweden and Hong-Kong (Telecom Australia, 1991, 3). The results from this work were printed in the report (1991). Although the service manager supported work into TTYs, he was reluctant to involve Telecom in any notion of funding the provision of equipment and re-stated stated Telcom's policy position that it was a Government responsibility (Telecom Australia, 1991, 1). The AAD Policy Adviser, representing AAD approached the Federal Government later that year.
In August 1990, the AAD Policy Adviser wrote a submission to the then Communications Minister, Kim Beazley requesting that the Government fund a TTY national relay service. He informed Beazley that detailed costings and demand for the service were being prepared by Telecom's Disability Program's Unit and that the Government's community service obligation (CSO ) would be an appropriate delivery mechanism. The AAD Policy Adviser suggested that the relay service could be funded through the annual budget allocation. (CTNPA2, 1994, 58; pers. comms. AADPA, 1997).
In April 1991, Beazley announced an Interdepartmental Committee (IDC) would undertake an inquiry to investigate the current telecommunications needs of people with disabilities and to determine if there was any need to extend the present services. The inquiry was framed by a changing competitive telecommunications environment demonstrated by the duopoly of Telecom and Optus introduced that year (Wilson, 1994, 58). The IDC was reluctant to place any threat on the carriers'ability to compete by increasing their community obligations:
The Department of Transport and Communications considers that widening AOTC's USO to encompass special assistance to people with disabilities would lessen AOTC's ability to compete effectively unless other carriers were also required to contribute towards AOTC's costs. However, a significant change to the Government's USO policy to require such contributions from other carriers could have legal implications for it could be regarded as a major change in the terms of Optus' licence. This view is accepted by other Departments but, over time, any legal implications of major changes to the Government's USO policy on the terms of Optus licence are likely to diminish (IDC Report in Wilson & Harper, 1993, 22).
The threat to competition in the deregulated telecommunications environment made the Government reluctant to place any further responsibility on the carriers. The IDC's decision appeared to justify the Telecom's position that TTY services were not the corporation's responsibility. In addition the potential legal implications involved with a possible breach of contract with Optus made the Government hesitant to extend the carriers' USO. Failure to link TTY services to the carriers' USOs weakened the position that telecommunication services for people with disabilities were a right. However, the IDC recognised that future funding for relay services could come fron carriers' USOs. The future option could be explored when Optus became established in the market. In its conclusion, the IDC recognised that there was suffucient evidence to implement a national TTY relay service but only as a concession. Wilson and Goggin observe that:
A majority of the IDC considered that there is a strong case for the provision of a TTY relay service and should be further investigated: however it recommended that TTY equipment should be provided on a concessional basis by state governments or by commmunity organisations, such as Deaf societies (1993, 21).
The human rights argument weakened further with the suggestion that community organisations should fund the service. The suggestion also fails to comprehend the level of national coordination and funds required to provide a workable national relay service (pers. comms. AADPA, 1997). Wilson and Goggin suggest that the committee's failure to adequately consult the community and consumer groups resulted in less than satisfactory findings (1993, 21). The IDC took more than a year to investigate the TTY issues and during this time the AAD Policy Adviser continued to raise the issue of TTYs with the Telecom Consultative Council generally, and also privately with Cameron (pers. comms. AADPA, 1997). The Red Book proved to be a useful aid in legitimising the user demand and cost estimate claims.
It appears that despite giving the official Telecom line, the disability program manager privately began to view TTY users as a potential market (pers.coms; AADPA; CTNPA, 1997). In 1991, the disability program manager used the Telecom report (1991) to support his argument and tried to convince senior management to support the TTY program in a joint venture with Government. He was convinced that Telecom was missing out on potential market revenue. Beazley's ministerial statement in April indicated an opportunity for Telecom to suggest Government fund the relay service and TTY equipment through consolidated revenue. However, senior management were unconvinced and the TTY issue remained unresolved. In 1992 the Disability Services manager was replaced.
According to a CTN Policy Adviser, the new Disability Services manager experienced similar tensions as his predecessor in his dealings with senior management. (pers. comms. annon, 1997). Demonstrating marketing flair, one of his initiatives was to change the name of the unit to The Aged and Disability Services Unit. Newell (1992) observes with this action that the manager removed the administrative focus of the department and emphasised a service delivery orientation in its place. In addition by linking disability with the elderly, many of whom had disabilities, the new manager aligned his department with a growing niche market as the baby-boomer generation grew older (Newell, 1992, 2-3).
The CTN Policy Adviser observes that the new Disability Services manager was on a steep learning curve in terms of learning about disability discourses and appeared to understand the rights discourses of equity (pers. comms. CTNPA; 1997). Newell (1992) confirms these observation and in addition notes that the manager recognised criticism of Telecom's corporate culture in that it viewed people with disabilities as ``essentially expensive and non-productive" (Newell, 1992, 3). Newell supports the criticism by referring to statements made by Telecom officers from the Operator Assistance Services section who were working on exemptions policies for the proposed system of charging for 013 directory calls. According to Newell (1992), the statements:
...appear to reflect a perspective from the AOTC officers involved which is informed by charitable and medical discourses, evidenced in the notion that people with disabilities who cannot use the telephone book may be exempted from a charge for the use of 013 Directory Assistance, as opposed to the notions of all people having a right to such a service...The concepts of manifest suffering, deserving poor, inability and the use of disease labels and established descriptors are important in this context (1992, 3).
According to Newell, the Telcom corporate perception of people with disabilities framed them as non-productive community sectors. Consequently, it is argued that many internal policy makers reinforced disempowering social constructions of disability that were based on traditional discourses. The implications of Newell's observations illustrate the complexity of rights discourses in that they challenge the social and political restrictions of traditional approaches to disability. In addition his comments arguably illustrate the political nature of everyday language which extends beyond using the fashionable jargon of ``political correctness".
In 1993, the manager of the Disability Services Unit was replaced (pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997). For the second time, the tensions faced by middle management in negotiating between the priorities of consumers with disabilities and those of senior managers appear to have resulted in premature departure from their positions. In addition both the managers appeared to have grown more sympathetic towards the requirements of people with disabilities but unable to convince senior management to alter their positions (pers. comms. CTNPA, 1997). However, while middle management and pressure groups had been unsuccessful, events occurring in the larger national political arenas were about to give legislative power to the rights discourse for people with disabilities. The Disability Disacrimination Act (1992) proved to be a powerful tool in the hands of consumer groups and rights advocates.